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David Bergman
Stockholm University and Swedish Defence University
Abstract
The present study examined failure in an extreme setting within a military parachute training course used to better prepare individuals
for combat. A grounded theory analysis of interviews and observations led to four interdependent reasons for failure, three mediating
factors of how failure was perceived, and eight ways of coping in how individuals handled failure. Two overarching master themes were
established of decision aversion where individuals tend to avoid making decisions regarding their own failure in order to minimize guilt
and shame, and externalization where attribution is made primarily to causes outside the self in order to maintain a positive self-image.
In a few cases, active measures were taken to overcome failure, most often by the ones with the strongest reactions of surprise and anger,
somewhat counterintuitively indicating that the worst reactions bring out the most successful coping. Suggestions for further research and
implementation in extreme military training courses are discussed.
Keywords: coping, leadership, parachute, failure
Introduction
‘‘The greatest teacher, failure is,’’ said Yoda to his padawan Luke Skywalker in the motion picture The Last Jedi,
signifying that in order to achieve strength and mastery students must acquire the ability to learn from mistakes and failure
(Kennedy & Johnson, 2017). Falling short of our goals is something that happens to all of us, whether it is in sports, in
education, or in our professions. Since failure is an undesired outcome, we will then have to deal both with an undesired
and often unexpected result as well as our perceptions of our own abilities. Failure can have negative effects, but handled
in the right way, it can also offer us valuable insights about ourselves. The most successful athletes, students, and CEOs
(or Jedi-knights) are not necessarily those who have never failed or made mistakes, but often those who have mastered
the ability to learn from them.
Although failure is present in all professions, military organizations differ in two central ways. The first is the
consequences of failure. For example, although failing at a task in a commercial company can lead to lawsuits, layoffs,
or even bankruptcy, failure in military organizations can lead to severe injury or even death for oneself and others
(Klann, 2003).
The second is the inherent problems in training individuals for such extreme conditions. An athlete can adhere to the
principle of specificity and get better at running a marathon by practicing exactly that. Similarly, an intern at a company can
learn skills required at a certain position by on-the-job training. But due to both ethical and practical reasons it would be
impossible to expose military personnel to the life-threatening dangers of real combat to better train for that situation.
Because of this, military organizations utilize training courses which exposes individuals to as an extreme environment as
possible within ethical limits (Meichenbaum, 1985, 2007). Exposing individuals to a high but manageable level of stress
will make them better prepared for similar future situations (Maddi, 2002, 2006, 2007; Maddi & Kobasa, 1984). One of the
most prominent examples of a substitute for combat is parachute training (Boe & Hagen, 2015; Kolditz, 2007; Samuels,
Foster, & Lindsay, 2010; Shalit, Carlstedt, Ståhlberg-Carlstedt, & Täljedal-Shalit, 1986).
Parachuting has been regarded as ideal to study the effects of extreme stress since it combines as much strain as can be
applied to a person within ethical limits, together with the stringent controls that can otherwise only be obtained in the
laboratory (Fenz, 1975). Since its introduction on a large scale in the military in the 1940s, parachute training has been
considered a good substitute for combat because individuals’ reactions have been described as similar to combat (McMillan
& Rachman, 1988). The experience has been described as ‘‘real or potential threat to life’’ (Basowitz, Persky, Korchin, &
Grinker, 1955, p. 23). Although stringent controls are in place, the individual knows that they cannot survive a fall from that
altitude. When performing the actual jump the individual will be forced to cope with this perceived threat to life and
perform certain active measures in order to successfully master the situation (Breivik, Roth, & Jørgensen, 1998).
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However, since the rationale behind parachute training
is to present as an extreme environment as possible within
ethical limits, not all individuals will be able to complete
the training. We often find that individuals will refuse to
perform and that highly stressful situations will produce a
rich variety of coping strategies (Bartone & Hystad, 2010).
The individuals who undergo military parachute training
are selected, highly competitive individuals within an
organizational culture that puts a premium on success and
winning with a ‘‘failure is not an option’’ mentality, where
failure has sometimes been regarded with contempt even
in peacetime training (Soeters & Boer, 2000). Since the
earliest studies on the subject, the considerable role of
military parachute training as a means for self-improvement
has been in contrast to the possible negative effects of being
labeled as a ‘‘quitter,’’ lacking the necessary skills as a
soldier (Kepecs, 1944). In such situations, individuals will
sometimes try to avoid admitting shortcomings or failure out
of shame and fear of missing opportunities or loss of social
status (Flam, 1993). Trainees’ own desire to accomplish the
parachute jump, win their wings, preserve the respect of their
classmates, and gain that of the cadre make the fear of failure
all the more acute (Basowitz et al., 1955).
Failure
Failure often causes a conflict between one’s self-
perceptions and the desired outcome. Generally, the
individual will try to protect the self from the adverse
consequences of failure by using specific coping techniques
so that when failing, a ready excuse for failure exists that
does not imply lack of ability (Martin, Marsh & Debus,
2001; Rhodevalt & Davison, 1986; Rhodewalt & Fairfield,
1991). Consequently, if the failure is unexpected and such
mechanisms are not in place the reaction could be more
severe.
When an individual is put in a context where failure
could occur which would have adverse consequences,
that individual will start to appraise the threat of failing
specifically and sometimes even set goals related to avoid-
ance (Martin et al., 2001). These methods are sometimes
referred to as ‘‘self-handicapping’’ where the individual
either makes the task harder for themselves thereby making
it easier to blame the obstacles instead of oneself (for
example over-emphasizing or actively escalating other
social and contextual problems) or making up justifications
for their potential failures such as injuries or physical
symptoms (Rhodewalt & Davison, 1986; Rhodewalt &
Fairfield, 1991; Rhodewalt & Hill, 1995).
The reaction to failure has also been argued to be related
to an individual’s way of thinking about, and reacting to,
a perceived outcome, specifically the level of success ori-
entation and failure avoidance (Covington, 1992, 1993).
Highly successful individuals naturally have lower focus on
avoiding failure and preparing for its implications, thus
reacting more severely when they do fail, while in the same
way those who have accepted failure even beforehand do
not seem to have the confidence necessary to deal with
challenges but will be better psychologically prepared for
failing (Norem, 2001). In addition, an individual’s way of
coping with failure can also determine how they will handle
similar or other tasks in the future. Beside the reactions of
shame and embarrassment, the individual can also experience
a reduction of self-esteem, questioning their future as well
as being apprehensive about the social consequences such
as potential loss of others interest or the risk of upsetting
important others (Conroy, 2003).
The Present Study
Although failure can have severe consequences, espe-
cially in the life-and-death rationale of the military, few
studies have focused on failures in extreme contexts such as
parachute training. Previous studies on this type of training
have primarily reported rates of failure only as a footnote or
as one mediating factor in their analysis of the positive
effects of those who successfully completed the same
training (e.g. Basowitz et al., 1955; Sharma et al., 1994;
Ursin, Baade, & Levine, 1978). Studies addressing failure
more specifically have focused primarily on key requisites
for success in extreme training situations and methods
for lowering attrition rates (de Souza & Feitosa, 2015;
Fitzwater, Arthur, & Hardy, 2018; Kiernan, Repper, &
Arthur, 2015). Although being a common tool to build
more capable soldiers and leaders, no known studies have
more closely examined the reactions to and possible effects
of failure in military parachute training. The purpose of the
present study was therefore to study how trainees handle




The present study was explorative and inductive in
design. The purpose was, in accordance with grounded
theory method, to capture data from informants in the
several ways described below and construct a model of the
process of and reactions to failure (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Data were collected over a three-year period on courses at
the parachute ranger training school.
Participants were treated in accordance with human
research principles and good research practices formulated
by the Swedish Research Council (2017). Specifically, all
participants were: (1) given information on the purpose
about the aim and scope of the research at the introduction
of each respective course; (2) informed about consent and
voluntary participation as well as their right to at any time,
without explanation, discontinue their participation and that
D. Bergman / Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments
if they choose to do so any collected materials regarding
them were then not used in the study; (3) informed about
confidentiality of the collected data and that they were
guaranteed anonymity; and (4) informed that the data
collected were for a specific use and would not be used for
any other purposes than the present research project. Since
the researcher was also a military officer but present solely
in a scientific role, it was emphasized that no data collected
about the participants’ individual performances would be
reported to the Military Academy or in any way affect their
future professional career.
Participants and Training Curriculum
Participants were 199 army and air force cadets from
three consecutive classes of the Military Academy,
conducting the parachute training course as part of their
training curriculum in August of 2014, 2015, and 2016
(N 5 60, 71, and 65 for each respective year). In addition to
the cadets, teachers from the Military Academy who had
not previously conducted the course participated all three
years (N 5 1, 2, and 1 for each respective year). In order to
get a comprehensive approach, participant cadets, partici-
pant teachers, as well as instructors and commanders in
the cadre were included in the data collection. This is in
accordance with guidelines for qualitative studies where
variation is desirable (Glaser, 1978, 2011; Glaser &
Strauss, 1967).
The course was conducted over two weeks. Participants
were accommodated at the training site and were relatively
isolated during the duration of the course. All training
facilities (classroom, training-hall, jump-tower, airfield,
dining-hall, and accommodation) were located within a
2 km radius. At the beginning, the participants were divided
into groups and assigned an instructor for the duration of the
course.
The participants were given theoretical instructions in all
aspects of parachuting as well as possible malfunctions.
Besides theoretical classes, emphasis was on practical
exercises where the individual is progressively introduced
to the different elements of parachuting which was then
gradually added in more complex drills and repeated
meticulously. Besides the instruction directly related to
parachuting, the entire course was conducted at a high pace
with an emphasis on formal discipline, more rigorous than
in other army units or the Military Academy, as well as
physical preparation. Movements between training events
were generally performed running in formation.
During the second week the participants were required to
complete three separate mandatory safety tests required
before being allowed to perform parachute jumps from
an aircraft and complete the course. The tests were (1) a
theoretical written test, (2) a suspended jump from a 12 meter
high jump-tower simulating a stable exit from an aircraft, and
(3) a landing-swing simulation of a parachute landing-fall
where the individuals were required to perform a controlled
roll designed to break the force of a parachute landing.
Individuals who could not successfully complete any test
were given supplementary instruction and a retry. Partici-
pants who failed a second time were removed from the
course. During the three years of the study, thirteen parti-
cipants were removed due to inability to meet the prescribed
standards on the tests.
In addition, physical examinations were conducted at
the beginning, and when needed during the duration of
the course. With individuals where injuries (antecedent
or related to the training) were considered a risk with the
strains of performing a parachute jump, the regimental
physician performed a more thorough medical examination.
Overall, five participants were removed for medical
reasons. Participants who were removed were handled on
a case-by-case basis as to whether they should stay at the
training site or leave.
Cadets who successfully completed the mandatory tests
went on to perform parachute jumps from a military
transport aircraft. They were then awarded the military
jump-wings to wear on their uniform at the end of the
course.
Data Collection
A major concern was to establish the role of the
researcher (a military parachute-qualified officer) as a
neutral part in the research setting. Participants were to be
convinced that the interest in them was from a purely
academic standpoint and that the researcher was in no way
involved in any part of instruction or assessment. This was
accomplished by participant observations and following
the course 24/7, including, for example, accompanying all
training activities as well as participating together with
them in their first parachute jump, sharing accommodation
in the barracks, eating together in the mess-hall, and
spending free time in recreational areas at the end of the day.
This reduced defensiveness and facilitated the establishment
of rapport which enabled unconstrained access to informal
conversations, both individually and within groups.
Focus during data collection was on those with diffi-
culties or those that could for some reason not complete the
training (total N 5 18 for all three years). Since it would be
practically and ethically impossible to increase the number
of participants who failed, focus was on combining different
methods of data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Observations
One method of data collection was that of participant
observations where the observer is a natural part of the
training environment and documents events and observa-
tions of importance (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The 24/7
approach enabled observations to be made during training
as well as leisure time. Specific focus was on evolutions
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where participants showed greater difficulties, most notably
the jump-tower where all participants were observed.
During the daily routine, field notes were taken.
Observational notes varied from short notations that for
example participant X did/did not show any difficulties in
tower-jump number Y, to more thorough summaries from
longer conversations. Observations were augmented by
audio recordings of key events such as specific parts of
instruction or tests. The recordings were then listened to
again when compiling of the observations was done.
Observations were summarized at the end of each day, and
at the end of the course, to facilitate interpretations and
analysis.
Interviews
In addition to the observations, twelve semi-structured
interviews were conducted: eight with individuals who
failed the course, two with teachers who participated
together with the cadets, and two with instructors. Not all
participants who failed wanted to participate or remained at
the training site long enough after being dismissed from the
course to get asked to do so.
The eight interviews with those who failed the course
were done with the intent of capturing how they perceived
and handled the adversity and failure. They were conducted
between two and at a maximum eighteen hours after they
had been dismissed from the course. For example, for those
who failed the landing test at the end of the day the decision
was made not to interview them late at night and in such
close proximity to their dismissal, but next day at noon
instead. The interviews were conducted in a permissive
environment, in a part of the garrison not used in their
training, with open-ended questions and only general
efforts to guide questions into specific areas (Kvale,
1996). General themes covered were according to the
sequence general–course–self: general questions regarding
the participant’s prior knowledge and initial impressions,
questions regarding each specific part of the course, and
finally the self and the individual’s perception of their own
performance, subsequently focusing on the part where they
experienced difficulties. Follow-up questions were often
such as ‘‘Tell me more,’’ ‘‘You mentioned X, could you
elaborate?’’ until saturation was reached. With teachers
(who did not fail) and instructors, the themes were the same
but focusing on the performance of participants. The
interviews were recorded and lasted between 20 and
45 minutes and were then transcribed in order to facilitate
the analysis.
Data analysis
All interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. The
printed material from the observations and the interviews
were then organized and categorized together and analyzed
in accordance with grounded theory application (Glaser,
2011, 2015; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The first part was to
perform an open coding, identifying units in each interview
identified as having a specific meaning. An example of a
code is given in the quote below.
(From) NN1 with background in the ranger battalion and
so on is expected some sort of ‘‘macho-thing’’ like this is
something he is expected to manage, being failed in the
(landing) swing is a big defeat when compared to a
logistics officer.
This quote was coded as ‘‘Unit belonging,’’ symbolizing
social identity within the military. The second step was to
organize the codes together with similar ones into overall
categories. The quote and the code above were categorized
with similar in the category ‘‘Mediators,’’ describing mediat-
ing factors as to how individuals will perceive their failure.
Observations were coded in the same way as interviews.
For example, an observation of an individual being over-
eager to leave the training site and actively avoided
confronting peers in doing so was coded as ‘‘Avoidance’’
and grouped in the category ‘‘Ways of coping.’’ In addition,
observations were grouped together with codes from
interviews, adding further insight in the meaning of the
code. For example, during one interview the participant
mentioned ‘‘heights’’ fourteen times, attributing acrophobia
for not meeting the prescribed standards on the test in the
jump-tower, including one incident of a so called ‘‘jump-
refusal’’ (cede to jump when being their turn). This
statement was paired with that the individual had not
mentioned such a problem in the initial health screening or
in subsequent conversations. Further, observations from the
jump-tower showed that although having indeed displayed
a common height vertigo present with almost all indivi-
duals in the 12 m tower, the individual had not shown any
of the more severe symptoms of pathological acrophobia
(e.g., nausea, difficulty breathing, panic attacks, loss of
bodily/bladder control, severe palpitations). This was
finally contrasted with other observations of individuals
who had reported acrophobia upon commencement of the
course and shown all the above pathological symptoms but
in contrast successfully performed jumps from the jump-
tower. In this way, mainly out of observations, the code
‘‘acrophobic attributions’’ was defined as blaming a
pathological fear of heights specifically for one’s general
inability to handle the situation. This was in accordance
with Glaser’s (2007) notion that all data are data, not just
what is being said but also the conditions of it being said
and all the data surrounding what is being told.
In the last step, the overall categories were paired
together. Finally, when compared together two longitudinal
‘‘master themes’’ were identified, present in the majority of
the categories. This generated the model presented in the
results section below (Figure 1).
Throughout the analysis, awareness was maintained of
the observer’s possible influence on the participants’ actions
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and answers as well as the inherent assumptions in coding.
Mitigation of this possible conflict was performed by letting
a second researcher verify the model in this regard. Inter-
rater reliability was further increased by choosing a person
who had limited military experience and no experience
whatsoever of the present training environment.
Results
The analysis resulted in the model presented (Figure 1).
The model consists of three parts. The first is the reasons an
individual can fail, which goes beyond what is stated in the
curriculum. Secondly, a number of mediators as to how
individuals will perceive the severity of their failure were
identified. The third and last part describes individuals’
ways of coping with the same situation. These three parts
all contribute to the master themes of decision aversion and
externalization. Below, each part of the model is presented
sequentially, finally leading to the master themes.
Reasons—To Which Non-Completion Can Be Attributed
The first category is the reasons an individual can fail,
divided into four codes described below. The constructs in
Figure 1. The reasons for failure, mediators of individuals’ perception of failure, as well as the ways of coping with failure after being dismissed.
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this category are interdependent. This interdependency
worked in two ways. First was the tendency to exaggerate
somatic symptoms, inducing a medical withdrawal instead
of risking failing to meet the prescribed standards in the
tests. Second was attributing medical conditions to the
inability to perform on the same tests. This is contrasted by
the opposite, similarly common phenomenon where highly
motivated participants tended to hide injuries or request
medical assistance in order to be able to continue and
complete the course.
Inability to meet the prescribed standards is the first
formal reason an individual can fail. In order to complete
the ground part of the training and proceed to making
parachute jumps the trainee has got to pass the three parts
(written exam, jump tower, landing swing). Participants
who fail in any part are given supplementary instruction
and a retest. Failure in the second examination leads to
dismissal from the course. Due to the inherent strains of
the course, success is in no way guaranteed. Or as one
instructor put it:
If you’re not a professional athlete or something as some
people this can be among the toughest thing they have
done with their bodies, and with their minds as well.
Medical reasons are the second way an individual can be
dismissed. Upon commencement of the course all trainees
are asked to complete a health inventory. Individuals with
more serious injuries (prior or sustained during the course)
are examined by the regimental physician. If the physician
concludes that the injuries are incompatible with the
inherent strains of performing a parachute jump the trainee
is dismissed from the course. The physician has decisive
authority over medically related issues, meaning a removal
for medical reasons cannot be overruled by the training
cadre.
Voluntary withdrawal is the third way. The course is
mandatory in the training curriculum; completion is
however not required for graduation from the Military
Academy. Although no such information is given at any
point, individuals who report themselves unwilling to
continue are first and foremost urged to move on, given
supplementary coaching or training, but if the will is
sustained, they are not forced to jump. During the three
years one individual chose to withdraw and later chose to
voluntary leave the Military Academy entirely.
Removed by instructors is the last way. If the instructors
at any point feel that an individual is at risk of harming
themselves and others, they have the ability to remove them
from training, even if they have passed the formal tests
required. During the three years of data collection one
individual was removed during an examination and not
given a chance to retrain and retry.
Mediators—The Individual’s Perception of Failure
The individual’s perceptions of and later reaction to
failure are related to three mediating factors. These also
affected the trainees’ ways of coping in the last part of
the model, for example that the most severe reactions
tended to lead to the most successful coping described in
active measures.
Unit belonging is the first mediatory factor, where
reactions to failure have been related to perceived closeness
between the participants’ perceived social identity within
the military and the paratroopers. For example, an indi-
vidual destined for the Ranger battalion will react more
severely than an individual from the Logistics branch since
parachuting is perceived as closer to their part of their
identity within the military profession.
Self-perception and previous experiences of failure
means that the participants’ reactions to failure have been
related to previous experiences of failing. Individuals with
few or no real previous setbacks have shown more severe
reactions. Among high-achieving, highly competitive
individuals, the experience of handling a failure of this
magnitude is generally low. Simplified, they have never
been forced to develop any strategies for coping with
failure because they have never really failed before. This
often manifested itself with surprise and anger. One
instructor describes the severe reactions of one participant:
This is probably the first time he has failed for real.
I know the type. Competitive like hell and hates to lose.
Proximity of jumping includes that the reactions to
failure have been more severe the closer to the actual
jump it has occurred. Being dismissed during the first
days of the course manifested milder reactions than being
dismissed after failing the last test only hours before the
first parachute jump. Since the system is designed to
maximize the individuals’ chances of succeeding, failures
will more often come late in the process. One participant
described this phenomenon as breaking a marathon with the
goal in sight.
Ways of Coping
This category describes ways of handling failures after
being dismissed from the course and for as long as
observations were conducted, including management of
participants from previous courses during year two and
three of the study.
Active measures describe those actions taken in actively
confronting and overcoming failure. These were character-
ized by introspection, individuals being aware of their own
shortcomings, and that actions were taken to confront the
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reasons rather than avoiding them. This is the only category
where individuals have been problem-focused rather than
emotionally focused and actively affected the cause of their
failure. This strategy included individuals who after having
failed a specific test insisted on carrying on and completing
the rest of the course together with their peers (although
being certain they would not be permitted to jump) in
order to further challenge and develop themselves, often
under the active support and positive peer pressure from
comrades. Other measures also include practicing leaps
from high ledges into a swimming pool and taking
mountaineering classes after the course to overcome an
irrational fear or phobia of heights. In two cases parti-
cipants reported back on their own initiative to recycle and
complete the whole course a second time, at that point
performing flawlessly and completing successfully. In
informal slang the mental attitude to overcome obstacles
despite substantial difficulties was sometimes referred to
as ‘‘Ranger the fuck up’’ (i.e., ‘‘Suck it up,’’ ‘‘Stop feeling
sorry for yourself,’’ ‘‘Keep on moving’’), acknowledging
that everyone experiences the same difficulties to varying
degrees but also that everyone possesses the mental
resources necessary to overcome them. The individuals
that have taken the most active measures have somewhat
counterintuitively been the ones who have shown the
strongest initial reactions of surprise and anger to their
failure, indicating that the worst reactions bring out the
most effective coping.
Dissociation is the described experiences of a mild
detachment from intent and the body’s reactions, including
the body not obeying commands or the individual not being
the one in command of their actions. Sometimes also a mild
out-of-body experience, watching themselves performing
safety-violating maneuvers such as reaching for the reserve
parachute handle. One participant describes the experience:
It’s almost like it’s not me who decides what happens,
sometimes and only sometimes it goes well and some-
times it ends bad so that was a little more frustrating.
This is also described in being told by instructors that
they have failed, recognizing the words said but not
understanding them or experiencing them as being told to
someone else (i.e., the other self they are observing).
Intellectualization refers to the process of removing
oneself emotionally by relating to the experience rationally.
This involves reflection of questions from personal to
general (talking about the course in general when asked about
their performance specifically), as well as questioning specific
parts of instructions or the tests. An example is giving a
critical review of the validity in specific examinations
rather than one’s performance on those tests.
Acrophobic attribution is holding a false or exaggerated
pathological fear of heights responsible at least in part for
one’s general inability to handle the situation. The heights
involved in training evolutions will create a common height
vertigo and mild uneasiness in all normal individuals.
However, several individuals attribute the acrophobia as
the reason for not being able to perform the necessary
procedures, despite having mentioned no such problem in
the initial health screening or showing any such symptoms
during training. In contrast, individuals showing clear signs
of pathologic acrophobia performed better despite their
problems. Similar to somatic injuries, having a phobic fear
of heights (being not entirely under the individual’s
control) is a more permissible excuse than not possessing
the required skills (being entirely under the individual’s
control).
Advantageous comparisons refer to the process of
reframing the comparison of one’s achievement from the
whole class to only others that failed, simplified: ‘‘at least
I wasn’t worst of those who failed.’’ This also included the
division of the present task into sub-categories, which had
been successfully completed before (e.g., enduring stren-
uous discipline and running, having flown military
transport aircraft, performed tandem-jumps). The advanta-
geous comparisons are done in order to redefine the frame
of comparison in order to put oneself in a more advan-
tageous position and thereby maintain a more positive
self-image.
Indifference refers to both a lack of caring about one
owns achievement as well as a disinterest in what complet-
ing the course could have given them. This includes a
‘‘motivational Catch 22’’: claiming to be convinced
beforehand that the course would not teach them anything
about themselves but arguing they would have been more
motivated to complete the course (and performed better) if
it would have taught them something about themselves.
Indifference in this regard is not being under-stimulated or
not challenged but rather being aware of not possessing the
level of skill required to confront a task and as a result
reducing or abstaining from adding value to that task.
Simplified, by not adding value to something an individual
will by definition not be disappointed when they do not
succeed at it.
Arrogance and anti-authoritarian contempt refer to a
superior attitude in making presumptuous claims and refer-
ences regarding the course and a general lack of respect for
the pedagogy used. One participant expresses:
I think that they [instructors] are pretty silly […] like
‘‘oh you must be hard’’ [growling imitating instructor,
then laughing out loud]. I don’t really know what to do
with that information.
The anti-authoritarianism was manifested primarily
against instructors (although not told to them directly).
But it was also observed against peers, jokingly mocking
their acceptance of the same authority in informal settings
during the course, for example when shining their boots
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meticulously in the evening or testing each other on the
theoretical aspects required to be memorized. The purpose
in this regard is not an inherent attitude against the whole
military system (they have after all volunteered to the
Military Academy) but rather to reduce the value of the
present task. If the individuals can persuade themselves
(and others) to devalue the achievement of completing the
course then the emotional effects of not doing so will
naturally be smaller.
Avoidance refers to both psychically and psychologically
creating distance between oneself and the phenomenon as
well as the ones associated with it. This includes leaving
the training site as immediately as possible after being
dismissed, and subsequently avoiding individuals asso-
ciated with such training. This way of coping manifested
itself primarily with individuals who had shown relief when
being dismissed. It also encompasses avoiding certain
topics of discussion by reflecting discussions from indi-
vidual to general (for example answering questions about
their performance with a monologue about something else)
or avoiding the topic in peer-to-peer conversations. One
participant introspectively describes the manifestation of
conversational avoidance when returning to the barracks
late at night after failing a retry at the final test:
For some reason it becomes a slight awkward atmo-
sphere, then I don’t know what I should say or they what
they should say, and I try to explain to them that ‘‘it’s
okay’’…It becomes an awkward situation a few seconds
per individual.
Master Themes
Two master themes were identified as overarching the
model, meaning they add further explanation of the cate-
gories described above and the presence of a larger
phenomenon in the majority of them. Both master themes
are concerned with protecting the self in order to minimize
shame and guilt.
The first master theme was that of decision aversion, the
tendency to displace decision-making in order to protect the
self and minimize guilt and shame. Individuals will to a
large extent avoid making decisions regarding their own
failure. Refraining from making the decision themselves
allows the individual to preserve a more positive self-image
and save face in front of peers. This can be seen in the
formal reasons, where it is more permissible to be removed
than to quit by one’s own decision. Attributing medical
symptoms (being out of the individual’s control) is a more
socially acceptable reason for failure than inability to meet
the required standards (being completely and only under
the individual’s control). Individuals who had somehow
anticipated not completing the course but without having
the strength to say so themselves often showed relief when
removed. One participating teacher summarized this as not
having the strength to complete the course but neither the
strength to admit to others (or themselves) that they would
be unable to do so:
One cadet was very relieved that someone else took the
decision for them. And that is to say did not have the
strength to get through and neither the strength to say
‘‘No, this is it, I’ve reached my limit.’’
Further, decision aversion was somewhat contradictorily
demonstrated in the category of avoidance where the
individuals showed a clear will to leave the training site
but would rather have someone in a position of authority
make the decision for them; wanting to leave but wanting
someone else decide they should leave. This was mani-
fested regardless of the reason for being dismissed. One
participating teacher from the Military Academy moti-
vates his decision of forcing individuals removed from
the course to decide for themselves whether to leave the
training site or stay with their unwillingness to make their
own decision in handling the situation, and forced them to
actively choose even if that choice included avoidance
behavior:
It was like a mark of shame on their forehead, and
I understand them…They wanted to leave as soon as
possible. (But) A choice is a learning situation, like
‘‘I have to make a choice and live with it,’’ and that is
why they got to make the decision. Otherwise I would
have made it too easy and made the decision for them to
stay and watch.
Externalization is the second master theme. Individuals
will generally externalize (attribute to causes outside the
self) before internalizing in order to protect the self. In
categories referring to locus of attribution this can be seen
in the use of external reasons such as somatic symptoms
or acrophobia for making the goals unobtainable instead
of internal reasons for not reaching them. For categories at
the individual level, attempts are made to displace focus
from internal reactions to external factors, manifested
in for example the reflection of questions from personal to
general in the category of over-intellectualization or the
dissociation experienced by some, with its mild exter-
nalizing detachment from their own body and its perfor-
mance. For categories at the social level this is manifested
also in categories such as indifference (claiming the goals
as irrelevant rather than oneself as unable), with arro-
gance and anti-authoritarian contempt (devaluing the
training and the performance of peers rather than evalu-
ating self-performance) or advantageous comparisons
(reframing and comparing as favorable against others
who failed rather than admitting one’s own performance
as substandard).
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Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate how
trainees handle failures in an extreme setting within a
military parachute training course. From previous research
we know that parachute training presents as much strain as
can be applied to a person within ethical limits (Fenz, 1975)
and that extreme training situations will present a variety of
coping strategies (Bartone & Hystad, 2010). The strong
reactions and rich diversity in ways of coping in the results
confirm this.
Several of the categories are in line with previous general
research on failure and what is referred to as ‘‘self-
handicapping’’ (Martin et al., 2001; Rhodevalt & Davison,
1986; Rhodewalt & Fairfield, 1991). Several categories
as well as the master theme of externalization are directed
at producing excuses for failure that do not imply lack
of ability. Granted, we cannot tell if excuses such as
acrophobia or somatic symptoms are completely made up,
as sometimes described as being the case in previous
research (Rhodevalt & Davison, 1986; Rhodewalt & Fair-
field, 1991), or decided as excuses beforehand (Martin
et al., 2001). As noted earlier, both physical fatigue and strain
as well as height vertigo are after all natural to the training
environment. But the results support that they are exag-
gerated regarding their impact on the outcome.
The two master themes summarize the main findings
concerned with protecting the self in order to minimize
shame and guilt. That the main part of the identified ways
of coping is concerned with external factors rather than
internal is consistent with previous research regarding a
self-serving bias and the need to maintain a positive self-
image (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).
Specific to failing in a military context, previous research
also supports the master theme of decision aversion and
that individuals will sometimes use medical discharge as a
socially acceptable lifeline at least in part to be allowed to
save face in front of peers (Basowitz et al., 1955).
Further, the social aspects of the results are interesting in
several ways. As mentioned, military cultures often harbor
a ‘‘failure is not an option’’ mentality and individuals
within such organizations are highly competitive, with
failure regarded as more unacceptable than in civilian
organizations (Soeters & Boer, 2000). The results are
ambiguous in this regard. First, the findings support that
failure in military settings is indeed emotionally charged.
The strong reactions from those who fail and their tendency
to avoid decisions or externalize reasons for their failure
support that failure is indeed connected with strong feelings
of shame and guilt. On the other hand, no indications show
that peers should consider someone a bad individual or
label them as ‘‘quitters’’ (Kepecs, 1944) solely for failing
the course. On the contrary, the active support and positive
peer pressure displayed from comrades indicate the exact
opposite as well as the results that the worst reactions bring
out the most successful coping. The saying ‘‘Ranger the
fuck up’’ that was sometimes used was not observed as a
means to degrade someone’s performance as substandard,
but rather acknowledge that the difficulties they experience
are to some extent experienced by everyone and reinforce a
belief with the individual that he or she possesses the
mental resources to overcome them, even if and specifically
when they do not believe so themselves. Consequently,
a ‘‘failure is not an option’’ mentality might be more
connected with individuals’ preconceptions than social or
institutional expectations. One suggestion for future research
could be to examine how individual perceptions and
organizational cultures affect motivation and performance in
this type of extreme military training.
There are several ways the present findings could be
used in both civilian and military practices. As of present,
the Swedish armed forces have no structured way to deal
with individuals who fail in this type of training speci-
fically, and follow-ups are made more on an ad-hoc basis
on individual initiatives. This question can be divided in a
motivational and a practical aspect. First, there is no one
assigned to mentor or coach individuals who fail in how to
turn that failure into a positive learning experience.
Previous research suggests that self-compassion, and an
accepting approach to personal failure in turn make indi-
viduals more motivated to improve themselves (Breines &
Chen, 2012; Neff, Rude, & Kirkpatrick, 2007). The need
for this type of follow-up is motivated further by the
rationale of the military context and the simple fact that
succeeding or failing in combat could affect the life and
well-being of oneself as well as others. A systemized
program for follow-up could possibly help individuals turn
a failure into a positive learning experience. The second
aspect is that the practical possibilities to come back and
complete the training a second time in order to make
remedies to one’s reputation or self-esteem are limited, to
not say lacking. Encompassing both these factors in a
systematic follow-up of individuals who fail would possibly,
not only in this extreme type of training, mitigate the nega-
tive effects of failure described.
Further, although parachute training is perhaps the most
prevalent example of preparing individuals for the extreme
strains of combat, it is not the only one. Others are for
example boxing (Samuels & Gibb, 2002), combative training
(Morales-Negron, 2009), survival training (Schmied et al.,
2015), and scuba-diving (Colodro-Plaza, Garcés, López-
Garcı́a, & Colodro-Conde, 2015). They share similarities in
that they present a perceived threat to life that requires active
mastery and are all used in some part to prepare individuals
for the stress of functioning under extreme contexts.
Presumably, under similarly extreme contexts individuals
will also fail, emphasizing the need for follow-up of indi-
viduals who fail in those settings as well. Further, military
personnel are not the only ones working under extreme
conditions, and numerous professions like law-enforcement,
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emergency services, or rescue workers could benefit from
similar kind of training.
The deficit of research in this crucial area could have
several explanations. Firstly, maximizing the chances for
success is arguably the best approach, making research
into identifying those factors that do so more prominent.
However, despite optimizing individuals’ chances some
will still fail, at the present course or others like it, making
such research equally crucial. Secondly, methodological
barriers make such studies harder (after all, studying
failures is easier in an office than at the end of an open rear
ramp of a military aircraft in flight). Thirdly, full unrestricted
access to strong military collectives or hazardous activities
such as parachuting is not always given to civilians.
The main limitation with the present study is the number
of respondents and consequently possibilities of general-
ization. Granted, the present results do not allow any
definitive conclusions to be made before being validated in
specific parts and contexts by further studies. On the other
hand, this was not the goal. The limitations in number of
respondents is not a scientific but an actual one, being made
from the number of individuals undertaking the training
during the number of years the study was conducted, not
the chosen scientific approach. Rather, the approach chosen
had the clear advantage of in-depth access granted to this
specific and extreme type of training as well as that it
produced insight in to the meaning of versatile and
qualitative data. Further, Glaser himself warns about data
overwhelm in collecting too much data and the quality
of the data to be more imperative than the number of
interviews (Holton & Walsh, 2016).
The present study has not discussed differences regard-
ing gender or other demographic variables. The data simply
have not indicated any such categories in the analysis, for
example being a mediatory factor. The gender distribution
of those who failed was roughly equivalent to that in the
Military Academy as well as the whole Swedish armed
forces. Although the present data do not allow any con-
clusions to be drawn, such factors could be relevant to
pursue in further research.
There is always an ethical balance in studying this type
of phenomenon. The research principles formulated by the
Swedish Research Council (2000, p. 41) specifically call
for caution in studying individuals in emotional crisis. This
is certainly the case in the present study, for some
individuals perhaps being the most uncomfortable experi-
ence of their life so far. However, the same principles also
state two requirements for such research to be conducted:
firstly that the goal of the research conducted should be
to attain knowledge relevant to the present group, and
secondly that other groups are unavailable in studying the
same phenomena. Since this type of military training is not
given to outsiders, and that the present research was perfor-
med explicitly in order to improve the training conducted,
both requirements are arguably met.
For further thought and studies, it is also worth pointing
out that the value in special training or symbols such as
jump wings—indicating special knowledge, skills, or
abilities—by its definition as ‘‘special’’ implies being
distinguished by some quality not possessed by everyone
and therefore requires the exclusion of others. In some
ways, value is added with uniqueness and maintaining
standards, where the inclusion of everyone would devalue
the achievement. This is not meant as an argument to
sacrifice some in order to make the others feel better, but an
acceptance of the possibility that, although rigorous selec-
tion is employed, both parachuting and combat represent
extreme contexts which place equally unyielding demands
on the individual and everyone willing (despite being told
to ‘‘Ranger the fuck up’’) might simply not be suited to
succeed.
References
Bartone, P. T., & Hystad, S. W. (2010). Increasing mental hardiness for
stress resilience in operational settings. In P. T. Bartone, B. H. Johnsen,
J. Eid, J. Violanti, & J. C. Laberg (Eds.), Enhancing human perfor-
mance in security operations (pp. 257–274). Springfield, IL: Charles
C. Thomas.
Basowitz, H., Persky, H., Korchin, S. J., & Grinker, R. R. (1955). Anxiety
and stress. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Boe, O., & Hagen, K. (2015). Using mindfulness to reduce the perception
of stress during an acute stressful situation. Paper presented at the
7th World Conference on Educational Sciences (WCES-2015), Athens,
Greece.
Breines, J. G., & Chen, S. (2012). Self-compassion increases self-
improvement motivation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
38(9), 1133–1143.
Breivik, G., Roth, W. T., & Jørgensen, P. E. (1998). Personality,
psychological states and heart rate in novice and expert parachutists.
Personality and Individual Differences, 25(2), 365–380.
Colodro-Plaza, J., Garcés de los Fayos-Ruiz, E. J., López-Garcı́a, J. J., &
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